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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LORENZO C. FORSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
E. GIRARD HALE, as Executor
of the Will and Estate of Mabel
Bean Forsey, Deceased,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 9598

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent brought an action against the appellant, E. Girard Hale, as Executor of the Will
and Estate of Mabel Bean Forsey, deceased, for
recovery of sums paid for the last illne'ss and funeral
expenses of deceased.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent was awarded a summary judgment by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson of the
Third District Court, and it is from this summary
judgment that appellant appeals.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased was named beneficiary under a
group insurance health and accident plan of the
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company (Exhibit P-1), which was issued to the Utah Furniture
Association and showed the name of Lorenzo C.
Forsey as the insured.
Pursuant to the terms of said policy, Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company paid the total
sum of $1205.41 direct to the hospital and doctors
for the last illness of the deceased.
The respondent, Lorenzo C. Forsey, after the
death of the deceased, made a claim on the estate
of the deceased, pursuant to Section 75-9-21 Utah
Code Annotated 195'3, for moneys paid for the last
illness and funeral expenses of deceased. The appellant, E. Girard Hale, 'aS executor of the estate of
deceased, refused said claim, and an action was
commenced in the Third District Court for the recovery of said sums ·('R. 1, 2) .
At the time of the pretrial conference (R. 9,
10), it was stipulated that the only amount in con2
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troversy 'vas the su1n of $1205.41, 'vhich was paid
by the insurance company for the last illness of
the deceased. The parties then each moved for summary judgment based on the foregoing facts and
contentions of the parties: It being respondent's
contention that if respondent is not entitled to recover the sum as paid by the insurance carrier for
the last illness, then the estate of decedent will be
unjustly enriched. It being appellant's contention
that it was not a payment of respondent's moneys
that were paid for said amounts referred to above,
but was a payment by the insurance company and,
therefore, respondent was not entitled to recover,
and further, that this is not a claim for reimbursement the court should make, because the respondent
has not paid out any moneys for the last illness of
the deceased.
The court then instructed the respective parties
to prepare briefs (R. 15-24), and upon reading the
briefs the court granted the plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment (R. 25, 26), said judgment
being subseqtlently amended (R. 27, 28) in the
amount of $2573.17, together with interest.
Subsequent to said amended summary judgment, appellant and respondent entered into a stipulation for part payment of the judgment in the
amount of $1460.00, said sums not being contested
by the parties in this appeal. Therefore, the only
3
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amount i11 controversy being that paid by the insurance company for the last illness of the deceased.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DOCTRINE OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY
UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

All that the respondent was, was an insured
and beneficiary under the terms of a group insurance policy, the same as his wife, Mabel Bean Forsey.
The only basis upon which the respondent could
recover would be under and by virtue of the statute
under Section 75-9-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953.
In other words, his claim must be one entitled under
and by virtue of said section. We feel that the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment cannot
and, of course, does not apply.
In the case of Straube v. Bowling Green Gas
Co., (Mo. 1950) 18 A.L.R. 1335, 227 S.W. 2d 666,
the co11rt in that case clearly sets forth the general
rule, and that is that the theory of unjust enrichment necessarily depends upon whether, by the receipt of the funds in controversy, the defendant in
this case was enriched at the loss and expense of
the plaintiff. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs
when he has and retains money or benefits which
in justice and equity belong to another.
4
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Un(ler no condition could it be said tlnder the
facts in this case that there is any evidence that the
respondent suffered a loss or expense in which the
deceased \Vas enriched. Unjust enrichment arises
not only wl1ere an expenditure by one person adds
to the property of another, but also where the expenditure saves the other from expense or loss. There
is no evidence whatsoever here that there was loss
or expense in any particular. Particularly, was
there no loss or expense aggregating the amount
of the alleged claim due the respondent in view of
the fact that the expense of the last illness was paid
to the doctors and hospital by the group insurance
carrier. 46 Am. Jur. 99.
POINT II.
TO HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED UNDER SECTION 7·5-9-21
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, RESPONDENT MUST
HAVE PAID OUT OF HIS OWN FUND'S THE EXPENSES OF THE LAST ILLNESS OF D'ECEASED.

Section 75-9-21 Utah Code Annotated 1953
governs the payment of the expenses of the last
illness or sickness, and provides as follows:
The executor or administrator, as soon as
he has sufficient funds in his hands, must
pay the funeral expenses and expenses of the
last sickness * * *.
It is the contention of the appellant that it was
a group insurance plan, and not the respondent
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Forsey, who paid a portion of the last illness expenses of the deceased and, therefore, under the
above quoted section, respondent had no claim on
the estate for reimbursement because respondent
had not paid out any moneys for the last illness of
the deceased. The group health and accident insurance plan in question was issued by the Lincoln
National Life Insurance Company to the Utah Furniture Association, having as its coverage Utah
Furniture Association members and their employees
and dependents. The particular insurance policy in
question (Exhibit P-1) was issued by the insurance
company to the Utah Furniture Association, and
deceased was designated as beneficiary and respondent as the insured. There is no evidence, however,
as to whether respondent or a Furniture Company
paid the premiums on this policy, although the letter
of explanation on the inside cover of said policy,
in referring to the insured, states that:

"'* * * We urge you to show appreciation of
the fact that your employer is paying a substantial portion of your premiun1."
The Utah case of Columbia Tr1tst Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089, 1093 (1924), lays
down the general rule as to what claims are allowed
under Section 75-9-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
.for the payment of the last illness expenses of de·ceased by a third person. In this case the widow of
6
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the deceased paid for the expenses of the last sickness of the deceased, and the court in allowing her
to be reimbursed from the estate in payment for
such moneys expended, stated:
"Hospital dues and medical attendance are
charges proper to be presented to and allowed
against an estate, and if paid by another are
proper charges to be allowed such person for
the money so advanced if reasona·ble in
amount."
Thus the court held that payment by another other
than the deceased for last illness expenses is entitled
to reimbursement for moneys so advanced. In the
case at bar, the insurance carrier, and not Forsey,
paid for the last illness expenses of the deceased.
The Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, In
Re Ra1tdle's Estate, 20 N.W. 2d 464, 465 (1945),
held that where the widow of the deceased made no
advancements from her own funds to pay the funeral
expenses of the deceased, but made payment from
funds turned over to her by the United Mine Workers for the purpose of paying deceased's funeral
bill, that she couldn't get reimbursement from the
estate for moneys which did not come out of her
own personal funds. In fact, the court held that
since the widow received $17 4.00 from the United
Mine Workers funeral fund and paid only $122.75
of this sum for funeral expenses, leaving $46.25
7
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for the estate to pay, that the widow was not entitled to any refund for the $122.75, and also that
the widow was to be charged the amount of $46.25
which the estate had paid for funeral expenses. In
other words, the widow would be unjustly enriched
if she could use the $174.00 from the United Mine
Workers fund to pay for funeral expenses, and then
be reimbursed that amount by the estate. It would
likewise be unjust enrichment for respondent to
claim the full amount of moneys paid by the insurance company for the last illness of the deceased.
There are many other cases holding that to have
a claim against an estate of a decedent, that sums
paid for funeral expenses or last illnesses must be
advanced by the person making the claim. The case
of Smith vs. Eichner, 215 Wash. P. 27 (19'23), held
that a husband of a deceased wife was entitled to
reimbursement because he had actually paid out of
his own resources expenses of the last illness. Other
cases are In Re Abramowitz' Estate, 9 N.Y. Supp.
2d 846 ( 1939), and Andrade v. Azevedo, 50 P. 2d
80 (C. A. Calif. 1935) .
POTNT III.
TO HAVE A VALID CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FOR THE EXPENSES
OF THE LAST ILLNESS, THERE MUST ALSO BE A
DE BT oF A PE·cuNIARY NATURE WHICH co·ULD
HAVE BE'EN ENFORCED AGAINST DECEASED IN
1
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1-fER LJFETIME AND
MONEY JUDGMENT.

REDUCED

TO

A SIMPLE

The rule is well established in 34 C.J.S. 95 that
the word "claims" :

"* * * has reference only to such debts or demands against decedent as might have been
enforced against him in his lifetime by personal action for the recovery of money, and
on which only a money judgment could have
been rendered".
This rule is also stated in 21 Am. Jur. 579.
It should be noted, however, that funeral expenses are an exception to the above quoted rule,
because as stated in Bancroft's Probate Practice,
2nd Edition, Volume 3, p·ages 532, 533:
"Funeral expenses are not properly a 'claim'
against the estate in the sense of being an
obligation contracted or incurred by the decedent. Neither are they expenses of administration. They are rather a charge against
the estate which the law authorizes because
of the dictates of society, * * *"
Thus, it is important to draw a distinction between
the expenses of the last illness and the expenses of
funeral expenses, because in the case of the expenses
of the last illness there is a debt contracted or incurred by deceased during his or her lifetime, while
in the case of funeral expenses there is hardly ever
a debt contracted for or authorized by decedent
during his lifetime.
9
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One of the leadiig cases in defining what constitutes a claim against the estate of a deceased is
Tinkham v. Tinkham, 45 Ind. N. E. 2d 357, 360
( 1942), which is very explicit in defining what
constitutes a claim against an estate. The court in
substance stated that a claim within a statute relating to an action against an executor or administrator is a debt or demand of a pecuniary nature
which could be enforced against decedent in his
lifetime and could be reduced to a simple money
judgment. This same doctrine is also affirmed In
Re Iverson's Appeal, 81 Minn. N. W. 2d 701 (1957),
and Ree.dy v. Alexander, 30 Miss. S. 2d 599, 601
(1947). The case of Gilbre~ath v. Line, 119 S. 2d 210
(Ala. 1955), held that there must be a relationship
of debtor and creditor between deceased and the
claimant to have a valid claim against the deceased's
debt.
It is obvious that when decedent died there was
no debt owing to respondent for her last illness,
as the insurance company had already paid the debt
and, therefore, respondent could not have enforced
the debt against decedent in her lifetime and reduced the debt to a simple money judgn1ent. Decedent satisfied the expenses of her last illness under
question in this case by virtue of the fact that she
was a beneficiary of a group health and accident
insurance plan, and at the time of her death she did
10
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not owe respondent or anyone else for the expenses
of her last illness. To hold that a member or employee of a furniture association, who is listed on
a group health and accident insurance policy naming another other than himself as beneficiary, can
then charge the estate of the deceased beneficiary
with a claim for the expense of the last illness paid
by the policy, when he has no claim against the
deceased which he could have enforced during her
life, is untenable.

11
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CONCLUSION
We feel, without any question, that this claim
does not come within the provisions of the Utah
Code Annotated, supra, in any particular.
It cannot come within the doctrine of restitution and unjust enrichment; nor is it a claim that
could have been enforced at the time of the death
of the decedent. Simply, all this amounts to is the
fact that a group insurance carrier paid to the
hospital and doctors under the terms of its policy
to the beneficiary named therein for performing
services during the last illness of the deceased.
If the view of the trial court is correct, then
the surviving spouses of every group insurance
policy, where the employer pays the substantial portion of the premium, would be entitled to be unjustly
enriched from the proceeds of a policy paid by an
insurance carrier. We think this is, without any
question, improper and cannot be supported by the
statutes or any law.
Respectfully submitted,
CALLIS'TER & KESLER
619 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
By_______________________________________________________ _
Attorneys for Appellants
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